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Abstract. 
The end of the Second World War saw global telecommunications governance 
renegotiated. The dominant British Imperial (later Commonwealth) network 
experienced multiple changes: the tightly integrated and collaborative imperial 
governance system fell away as the governing partners increasingly pursued their 
own, rather than a collective agendas and as the “imperial” company, Cable and 
Wireless’, dominance gave way to a competition and interconnection based regime as 
American firms and their networks entered markets hitherto closed to them. Though 
key elements of the Bermuda Telecommunications Agreement 1945 were soon to be 
renegotiated, the Bermuda Conference, at which the imperial partners and the new 
hegemonic power, the USA, bargained, was the fulcrum transitional event. Drawing 
on archival sources (notably in Canada and the UK) the author tells of the tensions 
within the fragmenting Imperial partnership, of an American mix of interest and 
idealism and of this episode in telecommunications liberalisation foreshadowing later 
changes.  
Keywords.  
Telecommunications, British Empire, United States, Post WWII, liberalisation, 
governance.  
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The Bermuda Agreement 1945. 
 
In spite of the differences of philosophies – with the United States of America 
nailing its flag to private enterprise and the British Commonwealth to public 
ownership – it has been possible to reach a very solid and practical measure of 
agreement and understanding…. I hope it will be a good omen for our co-
operation in other fieldsi.  
 
Introduction: the legacy of war.  
 
As the end of WWII came in sight, the negotiations on the post-war world began, 
meetings at Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July-August 1945) determined the 
macro-political shape of Europe; the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization (San Francisco, April-June 1945) agreed the UN Charter and in 
telecommunications the fulcrum event was the Bermuda Conference of November 
21st to December 4th 1945. At Bermuda, the world’s two dominant systems of 
international communications, the UK’s (and its Commonwealth partners Australia, 
Canada, India, New Zealand and South Africa) and the USA’s negotiated how the 
world’s two most important communications systems henceforth would be co-
ordinated. The new regime, negotiated by yesterday’s global power the British 
Empire, and tomorrow’s the USA, was cemented in the Bermuda Agreement (UN 
1947). 
 
Bermuda came about both because users and (at least some of) the UK’s partners in 
the imperial system (notably Australia) were looking for change and because the 
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USA, exiting WWII with augmented power, refused to be excluded  from access to 
the world’s major telecommunication network. But change to post WWII global 
communications was not quite as Hills (2002) constructed it – a neo-mercantilist tale 
of growing United States and private sector hegemony as a notable “tool of Empire” 
(Headrick 1981) slipped from Britain’s palsied grip into Uncle Sam’s firmer hand. 
Rather Bermuda tracks a narrative of the UK (with its imperial/Commonwealth 
partners) bargaining with the USA and together shaping the new global 
communications regime of joint hegemony. This new regime both included the USA 
and, on the imperial side, was characterised by a change in governance with private 
ownership falling away as the “British nations” (Menzies 1956) nationalised their 
global telecommunication assets.  
 
The imperial communications system and its decline.  
 
The imperial “legacy” system was operationally based on the Cable and Wireless 
companyii and overseen by a supervisory body, first named the Imperial 
Communications Advisory Committee (ICAC), 1928-44, then the Commonwealth 
Communications Council (CCC), 1944- 1949, and later the Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Board (CTB), 1949-1968iii. These bodies were dominated by 
what Menziesiv (1956) called the “old Commonwealth”. Cable and Wireless’ v 
network was, as the company name states, based on two distinct technologies - 
wireless and cable. Development of wireless telegraphy (particularly the Marconi 
“beam” system in the 1920s) made possible a bypassing the legacy “all red” cable 
system linking the imperial centres. Moreover, when atmospheric conditions 
permittedvi, wireless was considerably cheaper than cable. The cable system had been 
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built (and was maintained) at great cost and the combination of the interests of the 
operating company (though incorporating wireless telegraphy, as the name “Cables 
and Wireless” adopted in 1929 testifies, was dominated by the cable interest), the 
perceived superior security of cable over wireless and the preponderance of a cable 
interest in policy and supervisory institutions meant that wireless had, prior to the 
second World War, not developed as rapidly as its proponents hoped.  
 
Chief among wireless’ sponsors was the Australian government which saw in wireless 
both a way to advance its native national champion, the AWA – Amalgamated 
Wireless Australasia - company, (in which the Australian Government had a 
significant shareholding) and to reduce the price of telegraphic communication, 
notably with Australia’s main trading partner - the UK. Wireless’ importance grew 
with America’s entry into WWII (at the end of 1941) as the USA rapidly built a 
significant wireless infrastructure – not least in Australia which became a major base 
for the Pacific campaigns dominated by the United States’ forces.  
 
The end of the war posed the question of what to do with the wireless infrastructure 
built during hostilities – absurd to decommission and waste it – this, coupled with the 
United States’ increased political weight meant that the “all red” system could no 
longer resist American (and Australian) pressure to establish new circuits 
interconnecting the legacy imperial and emergent US global networks. From the UK’s 
(and Cable and Wireless’) point of view, radio circuits made possible both bypassing 
the integrated, cable based, legacy system and cherry picking the most profitable 
traffic to the detriment of the legacy system as a whole. Whereas for the USA, and 
Australia, radio offered entry to a market which had, hitherto, been largely closed, 
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realisation of value from the infrastructure it had constructed during hostilities and 
opening up of access to communications thus benefitting people across the globe.  
 
America’s post-war dominance certainly stimulated change in the imperial, legacy, 
system but no less important was the Dominions’ (and India’s) aspirations to 
autonomy in the management and organisation of their international communications. 
As Frederic Soward, viia member of Canada’s delegation to the 1945 London 
Conference and the de facto leader of Canada’s Bermuda delegation (who chaired the 
key Bermuda Rates and Circuits Committee), wrote, in the late 1940s, Canada and the 
other Dominions enacted “in telecommunications” a shift congruent with that “in 
foreign policy and defence, the same tendency towards greater decentralization and 
voluntary co-operation” (Soward 1950: 237).  
 
The USA: interest and idealism. 
 
The United States’ objectives in post-war telecommunications were, as Hills (2002, 
2007) and others have represented it, to obtain entry for American businesses to the 
global electronic communications market but also to reshape global communications 
in the image of American liberal values. The latter objective has been somewhat 
underplayed in the dominant contemporary neo-mercantilist real politik narrative 
which Hills has so much influenced but was far from negligible.  
 
In 1944viii Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from 1939-
1944, James Fly stated that the US policy objective was “complete freedom for all 
peoples of the world to communicate directly with each other”ix. To be sure, Fly’s 
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gloss on this aspiration defined the UK’s exclusion of US business from its networks 
as a principal obstacle in the way of unfettered global intercommunication - “England 
now is able to dictate the terms and conditions upon which American communications 
with important points in its empire can now take place”x Fly’s diagnosis was 
supported by a US carrier’s, Mackay Radioxi, failure to secure the UK’s permission 
for new wireless services between the USA and Burma and the USA and the Malay 
States.  
 
Fly’s arguments were formally escalated in the diplomatic hierarchy through the US 
Ambassadorxii  to London’s letter to the UK Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. The 
US Ambassador urged an early meeting to negotiate “the future right of the USA to 
establish “direct radio telegraph and radio telephone circuits from the United States to 
points in the British Empire and agreement on low uniform telecommunication rates 
covering all communications between places in the United States and places within 
the British Commonwealth……….. particular attention should be given to low rates 
for press communications and to the reallocation of certain American and British 
cables”xiii. Eden dragged his feet and the Foreign Office responded only on 12 
October 1944, claiming that the Secretary of State was away and that the complexities 
of the issue meant that the UK could not concur with the American desire for speed: 
only “next year” would the UK (and Dominions and India) be ready to enter 
discussionsxiv. Nonetheless, US pressure (coupled with the Australia’s discontent) 
resulted in the UK and its partners agreeing to work out a new global communications 
order with the USA in Bermuda late in 1945. 
 
 8 
Fly’s favoured policy promised to do no harm to US business and accordingly his 
rhetoric may be interpreted as disingenuous but it need not be so. After leaving the 
FCC, Fly became Chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union and was 
subsequently denounced as a Communist. It’s not necessary, therefore, to interpret his 
advocacy of the communicative freedoms of the peoples of the world as simply 
camouflage for a hard nosed pursuit of American corporate interests.  
Cable and Wireless’ diminishing legitimacy. 
In contrast to the Americans’ warm words, Sir Edward Wilshaw, Chairman and 
Managing Director of Cable and Wireless, saw the US’ aspiration to foster “good will 
between peoples and communities “as a trojan horse presaging “the ruination of Cable 
& Wireless Ltd., as a consequential reversion of traffic from the Company would so 
reduce its revenue that it would be unable to maintain itself”xv.  
 
However, Wilshaw received little support in the UK or the wider empire. Not only did 
the imperial partners want to run their own shows, in telecommunications no less than 
in government, but Cable and Wireless had won few friends during wartime. Wilshaw 
had alienated many by not turning up to the 1942 Canberra Commonwealth 
Telegraphs Conference and the Conference’s censure of his absence was echoed by 
his British superior, Clement Attlee (when Secretary of State for Dominion Affairsxvi 
– a bad man to alienate given that he was to become Prime Minister the following 
year) who echoed the Conference’s regret at “your inability to accept the invitation of 
the Australian Government”xvii. Moreover, Cable and Wireless had fierce and 
influential critics amongst its customers. For example, Reuters’ News Manager, 
Walton Cole, wrote to the Cable and Wireless Press Liaison Office with “very grave 
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complaints” and “great dissatisfaction”xviii. Wilshaw’s lack of diplomacy in dealing 
with key stakeholders meant there was little dissent from, or debate about, the 
desirability of nationalising the company (which took place in 1946)xix and 
restructuring its business by opening its reserved markets to American competitors.  
 
The Bermuda Conference. 
 
The Bermuda Conference of 1945 thus marked a watershed in a complex and multi 
facetted transition from separate global communications infrastructures (among which 
the British Empire’s was by far the most significant) with limited interconnection to 
an integrated global system (with predominance passing to the USA). In this 
transition the imperial partners remarkably found common cause when faced with the 
USA - despite their dissatisfaction with the UK based Cable and Wireless company; 
their drives towards greater national independence and autonomy; and the close 
relationships forged with the USA (particularly by Australia and Canada) during 
WWII. 
 
In the Cable and Wireless view of things, centralised hierarchical control of the legacy 
system made eminent sense. But that was neither the only way to look at the global 
telecommunications infrastructure (it left out other routes and nodes – notably those 
related to the USA) and did not acknowledge the potential of new wireless routes to 
establish a more networked, decentred and interconnected system which increased 
connectivity and reduced costs (though articulating power differently). A new system 
architecture was attractive to those disempowered by legacy arrangements. Here was 
a classic manifestation of the problem of the “network externality”: all parties 
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benefitted from new users interconnecting with an established network. But not all 
users benefitted equally: new entrants benefitted more than did incumbents. For 
interconnection provided new entrants with connections to many other users whereas 
incumbents benefitted only from connections to the relatively fewer connections 
provided by the new entrant(s). Cable and Wireless were doubtless right to assert (as 
the company did in underlined typescript) that “the Americans desire to substitute 
New York for London as a telegraphic centre to their own advantage and to the 
detriment of the Empire system”xx but more was at stake than this. Cable and Wireless 
effectively controlled global connectivity and it sought to retain this monopolistic 
power – even though its network’s utility would be enhanced by access to the 
connections controlled by the US firms.  
 
Though tainted by the obvious interest of the source, a paper received by the Cable 
and Wireless Court of Directors in 1944xxi testified to the reality of concerns about 
competition from American radio: a table, dated 21 January 1944, estimated the 
Company’s annual losses (and losses experienced by other British interests) 
consequent on the direct radio circuits established by the USA during WWII to be, in 
round numbers, around £200,000pa.xxii However, Cable and Wireless’ interests had 
come increasingly to diverge from those of the imperial partner governments. The 
“Empire system” was no longer serving optimally the interests of all participating 
parties. As Barty-King rightly observed, in this context “technical efficiency was not 
the only criterion; there had to be an awareness of the sensitivities of an era in 
imperial history in which the watchword was self-determination” (Barty-King 318). 
Though there is room for doubt whether Cable and Wireless actually had provided 
technical efficiency (and whether its control model was that best adapted to securing 
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efficiency in a fast changing environment), Cable and Wireless was right to make the 
network externality argument The USA did stand to gain more than Cable and 
Wireless and once the USA was networked, there was little to prevent further descent 
down a slippery slope of interconnection: as Cable and Wireless argued (in underlined 
typescript) “The French, the Belgians, the Dutch and the Portuguese………. would 
also like to share in the Empire traffic……. In each case the gain to them is 
unilateral”xxiii.  
 
But Cable and Wireless’ argument neither recognised the post-war displacement of 
Britain by the USA, nor the diverging interests of the partner governments (Australia 
in particular) nor the network externality benefits, albeit unequally enjoyed, that 
interconnecting with “The French, the Belgians, the Dutch and the Portuguese” 
potentially afforded. Neither did it appropriately acknowledge the benefits of wireless 
in expanding global interconnection by establishing new routes and reducing prices. 
The company’s arguments were from the past rather than to the future and fittingly 
came from a man, Wilshaw, who, during WWII, had travelled around London in a 
horse drawn carriage.  
 
The United States’ objectives at Bermuda were, as Paul Porter the FCC Chairman 
(who had recently replaced Fly)xxiv stated in his closing address to the Conference, “to 
participate fully and effectively in the sphere of international communications”xxv. For 
the UK, rates and pricing was the key concern. The leader of the UK delegation (and 
spokesperson for the Commonwealth), Sir Raymond Birchall, said in his opening 
address to the Conference that “rates is in our opinion the most fundamental of 
all”xxvi, for him rate setting depended on network capacity and the intensity of 
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competition both issues bearing directly on the role and legitimacy of the direct radio 
circuits sought by the USA.  
 
The core of the Bermuda Conference: The Rates and Circuits Committee. 
 
Four separate committees were established to progress the Bermuda Conference’s 
business, notably: 
 
i) rates and circuits chaired by Frederic Soward (Canada). 
ii) technical developments chaired by Major-General F.E. Stoner (USA). 
iii) Exclusive arrangements chaired by R.A. Gallop (UK). 
iv) Cables chaired by Rear-Admiral J.R. Redman (USA).  
 
Of these, the Rates and Circuits Committee was by a long way the most important as 
was reflected in the duration and number of its sittings and the length of its reportxxviit 
to the final Conference plenary. Soward had been appointed Chairman of the Rates 
and Circuits Committee, ostensibly because Canada was “the country less directly 
affected by the issues”xxviii but doubtless also in recognition of the outstanding 
competence of the Canadian delegation. Like the other Committees, Rates and 
Circuits reported to a Conference sitting as a Committee of the whole (also chaired by 
Soward) which adopted and approved the Rates and Circuits report on the closing 
day, 4 December 1945. 
 
The USA argued that there should be no obstacles to new radio circuits and, further, 
that such circuits should be able to carry transit traffic (thus opening up competition 
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even further by potentially “bypassing” other, direct, routes not directly subject to 
competition). The UK opposed the US proposals, arguing that new routes should be 
authorised only where capacity constraints in the legacy infrastructure could be 
demonstrated and that such new routes should not handle transit traffic.  The 
contradiction between these positions expressed a deep, fundamental, disjuncture –
between a (with qualifications and exceptions) planned, hierarchically ordered and 
integrated system (freighted with the weight of history, habit and the Empire’s waning 
hegemony) and a more flexible, responsive, interconnected network of networks 
governed by market principles. Loosely mapped onto this contradiction were the rival 
claims of proponents of the “old” technology of wired, cable, circuits and those of the 
“new”, wireless, technology of radio circuits.  
 
Recommending a compromise, the Rates and Circuits Committee proposed that three 
of the wartime radio circuits established by the USA should be discontinued but that 
others, notably those between the USA and Australia, India and New Zealand, be 
retained and that rates should fall. Further, new radio circuits between the USA and 
Ceylon, Greece, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
Singapore were permissible. But that “traffic normally handled over direct radio 
circuits will be restricted to traffic originating in and destined for the countries 
operating the radio circuits. Transit traffic may be handled over the direct circuits….. 
where it is agreed that it would otherwise be subject to excessive delay”xxix. Whilst 
agreeing that rates should fall (one of the USA’s chief objectives), Commonwealth 
delegates argued that the cost base on which pricing decisions were made should 
include both cable and wireless infrastructures - thus preserving the viability of the 
legacy cable infrastructurexxx. However, Soward reported, “at no time did the 
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American delegation object to the Empire preferential rates, much to our surprise”xxxi. 
Soward’s surprise is understandable given that, on November 9, the Canadian 
Ambassador in Washington had sent a teletype to the Secretary of State External 
Affairs reporting that a State Department official, Mr Radius, “obviously without the 
prior knowledge of Mr deWolf proposed nothing less than the British give prior 
assurances that the Imperial preferential rate system be abolished”xxxii.  
 
Bermuda outcomes. 
 
The outcome, as with any successful international negotiation was a compromise, 
largely worked out in the rates and Circuits Committee, salted with abundant 
compliments to and from the negotiating parties. The Rates and Circuits Committee 
dutifully testified to the “efficiency of the United States radio carriers” and, 
reciprocally, to the “efficiency…. likewise recognised of the world-wide cable 
network”xxxiii.  Some radio circuits were retained, the development of others endorsed, 
some rate reduction embraced, transit traffic permitted under certain conditions and so 
on. The US had opened up the system to competition and interconnection, the 
Commonwealth had limited the extent to which the hegemony and operating 
principles of the legacy imperial system was compromised. 
 
The Bermuda Conference marked a classic incumbent versus new entrant 
disagreement which was to be reprised in countless analogous instances: such as 
MCI’s entry into United States’ trunk telephony; the UK’s post-liberalisation 
transition from British Telecom’s monopoly to, first, duopoly and then full 
liberalisation; the European Union’s liberalisation package of the early C21st; and so 
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on. It was also a significant milestone in the process whereby, as Hills observed, the 
USA supplanted the UK (and its imperial partners) as the world’s dominant 
international telecommunications provider. And Bermuda was a milestone in the 
process of imperial decoupling triggered by WWII and which accelerated during the 
1950s and 1960s. However, the Bermuda Conference was also striking for 
Commonwealth/imperial solidarity for, when faced with the United States as a 
bargaining partner, the Commonwealth acted with almost complete unanimity.  
 
Negotiating style and strength. 
 
Soward wrote an informal report, dated 12 December 1945, on the conduct of the 
Bermuda Conference. This circulated only among Canadian officials (notably in 
External Affairs and Transport and was classified “Secret”xxxiv). Soward stated, “The 
British Commonwealth countries presented a united front on almost every 
question”xxxv although “The Commonwealth delegates, except those from the United 
Kingdom, did not play a conspicuous part in the Conference” not least because the 
“chief differences concerned the United Kingdom and the United States”. Conference 
records generally show first the UK’s response to the US and, equally generally, 
follow by recording the Dominions’ and India’s chorus of agreement with the UK. In 
response, for example, to the US’ proposals on rates the Secretariat recorded that 
“Australia concurred generally in the comments of the United Kingdom”; New 
Zealand “Agreed with the United Kingdom comments”; South Africa “Also 
concurred with the United Kingdom comments”; Canada “Concurred generally in the 
views expressed by the United Kingdom and India”xxxvi. Faced with the US “other” 
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the Commonwealth’s internal conflicts and its members’ concurrent independentist 
moves fell away in favour of a habitual imperial solidarity.  
 
Doubtless the trust and mutual knowledge built up over decades of joint management 
of the imperial system, coupled with the hammering out of a shared negotiating 
position between many of the Commonwealth delegates during a shared trans-Atlantic 
voyage counted for much. As Soward conjectured, “It was obvious that they had 
worked together in London and on board ship to draft their campaign”.  He testified 
that, despite the UK delegation’s initial attitude of “suspicion and condescension” and 
treating “the Americans as irresponsible children in telecommunications matters”, by 
the end of the Conference US representatives had become “most impressed by the 
capacity and skill of the United Kingdom delegation”xxxvii.  
 
In contrast, Soward found that the US delegation “was too large, did not function 
effectively as a group, and had not carefully thought out its plan of operations…… It 
was much less effective than the United Kingdom group”. Indeed, though US 
objectives seemed clear and had been forcefully set out by Fly, there were 
contradictions in the American stance which the UK had earlier identified: “There is 
evident divergence of policy between the State Department and the F.C.C.” And 
further, “the United States Government machinery is such as to make it extremely 
difficult for one body whether State Department, F.C.C., or any other to give a 
decision which will be accepted by all the various telecommunications interests”xxxviii. 
Lack of full and effective co-ordination between the US delegates was notable and 
provided opportunities for the Commonwealth delegations. The State Department and 
FCC’s lack of co-ordination foreshadowed what, forty years later, a Canadian 
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Ambassador to Washington, Allan Gotliebxxxix, saw as a structural feature of US 
political life: how Gotlieb asked “do we settle our differences…….. with a country in 
which political power is so broadly diffused?”xl 
 
Bermuda consequences.  
 
A triumphalist Press Release, dated 26 March 1946 issued by RCA Communications, 
followed the Conference closure. RCA claimed the Bermuda Agreement was “one of 
the most significant moves for the benefit of the public ever made in the field of 
international communications” and that the “drastic reductions” in prices were a 
tribute to “American methods of scientific research and technological development 
under private enterprise”xli.  
 
The US objectives – competition, enhanced entry of radio and wider participation “in 
the sphere of international communications”, as Porter stated in his closing address, 
were, at least in part, achieved. Despite the unanimous Commonwealth desire to 
protect and preserve the cable system: “All, including Canada, felt the need of 
protecting the operation of the Cables System against unnecessary and uneconomic 
competition from direct radio circuits”xlii. A significant degree of liberalisation and 
rate reduction was set in train but entry was limited and the sunk costs of the cable 
infrastructure acknowledged in the rate base for pricing decisions. Both incumbents 
and new entrants could point to successes. Porter testified to the Commonwealth’s 
“substantial departure from traditions” and to having “made concessions…. to the 
new technology”xliii. The Economist of 4 May 1946 estimated that the Bermuda 
Agreement realised benefits of £1.5m for the USA and £260,000 for British Empire 
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interests – just the unequal order of benefits that might be expected to accrue to 
entrant and incumbent when a network externality is present.  
 
In the event, RCA’s joy did not last long, and the American methods touted 
triumphally proved less durable than RCA hoped. American companies found it 
difficult to operate profitably under the new rate regime. Again, the experience of 
post-Bermuda liberalisation of global telegraphy foreshadowed later 
telecommunication liberalisations. Incumbents are able, once they treat infrastructure 
as sunk costs, to reduce prices whereas new entrants have to fund the build out of a 
new network infrastructure. Paradoxically, successful liberalisation may require 
relatively high prices for a period before a durable competitive regime is established. 
Accordingly, in 1949, at US request, the parties met again – this time to raise rates. 
 
Bermuda renegotiated. Bermuda Revision Meeting London 8-12 August 1949. 
 
The tensions arising from the Bermuda liberalisation were formally addressed in 1949 
at a London Bermuda revision meeting held “at the request of the United States which 
had found that the ceiling rates agreed at Bermuda were insufficient to “bring United 
States carriers a fair return”xliv. The combination of significant capacity increase, 
consequent on infrastructure building during WWII, and reduction in traffic after the 
war’s end (forces mail, official communications, war management communications 
all fell away) forced a cost/revenue squeeze on US companies. These pressures were 
amplified both by the devaluation of several currencies, not least the pound sterling - 
the response of the USA to the UK’s devaluation of the pound from $4.03 to $2.80 to 
the pound on 19 September 1949, shortly after the revised agreement had been signed 
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on the basis of a pre-devaluation exchange rate, can readily be imagined - and by a 
move away from the pre-war norm of pricing international telecommunication 
settlements in gold francs.  
 
The Bermuda Revision Meeting further liberalised direct, country to country, radio 
circuits - subject to maintaining a prohibition on transit traffic (ie no “by-passing”) - 
and recognised that “the trans-Atlantic cables form an integral part of a world 
telecommunication system” and that “uniform procedures and techniques” were 
required for their successful operationxlv. Parties agreed that establishing new circuits 
was a matter for the two governments concerned and revised telegraph rates upwards, 
(standard ceiling rates rose from 30 cents to 40 cents a word and rates for coded and 
press telegrams also rose). Finally, the parties committed themselves to mutual 
consultation on all matters governed by the terms of the agreement – rather as the 
imperial/Commonwealth partners had been doing for the preceding twenty yearsxlvi.  
 
Conclusion. 
.  
Despite later price rises, the Bermuda Agreement triggered a general reduction of 
global rates as other countries, exchanging traffic with parties to the Agreement, 
secured comparable terms. Moreover, transit rates, which strictly should not have 
benefitted from the reduced rates for traffic carried over direct, country-to-country, 
circuits, also fell in response to novel arbitrage and routing possibilities. Bermuda was 
a transitional, fulcrum, moment – an ordered, rule governed and more or less 
monopolistic system changed into a less ruly interconnected network of networks 
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with more possibilities for arbitrage, more anomalies and more incentive for operators 
to price competitively and for governments and firms to act opportunisticallyxlvii.  
 
Post-Bermuda, co-ordination of the Commonwealth system became more 
complicated, involving more and more consultation and exchanges of paper between 
the (growing number) of parties (as the contents of contemporaneous files show). 
What had been facilitatory co-ordinating arrangements became ever more 
cumbersome and costly. Why should, for example, Canada be consulted, and have to 
decide, on the pricing of telegraph traffic between Australia and Dutch Timor? Why, 
when Canada had no forces occupying Japan, did it have to consult on rates for forces 
telegramsxlviii to and from Japan? Why did the USA have to notify Canada (and 
Canada respond) of changes to RCA’s rates between Sweden and Guam? Why 
consult Canada on a direct wireless link between India and Egypt? All this, and more, 
faced the growing number of partners in the Commonwealth system. The answer to 
these questions was, of course, an institutional and historical one:  
 
By the mid 1950s the merits of the “networked” non-hierarchical, consultative, 
imperial/Commonwealth system of governance of the Commonwealth system had 
become outweighed by the disadvantages of the grotesque amounts of work required 
to make the legacy consultative system work. Masses of paper circulated noting 
changes of rates, asking which compound words should be permitted (is 
“hindquarterofbeef” acceptable as a single word?), how should pricing anomalies be 
resolved? What should be done about accounting when exchange rates were 
changing? The growing costs of co-ordination, as well as the entry of the US carriers 
into what had formerly been a chasse prive for the imperial insiders, led to the gradual 
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falling away of the imperial habits, a growing bilateralism in the management of 
infrastructure and pricing, a supplanting of networked by market relationships and an 
increasingly ad hoc set of alliances and consortia collaborating case by case in 
building out a global telecommunications infrastructurexlix.  
 
The Bermuda Agreement marked the first big wave of change - showing that the new, 
de-centralised, interconnected and networked, global telecommunications system 
characterised by ever increasing capacity might more efficiently and economically be 
governed through markets and prices. This transition was halting, uneven, marked by 
two-steps-forward-one step-back changes and was never total or complete but, 
henceforth, co-ordination of global telecommunications was increasingly effected 
through government to governmentl, firm to firm relationships with (generally falling) 
prices set through market competition rather than administrative decree.  
 
This process has, in retrospect, an inevitability about it. The suppression of demand, 
braking of technological innovation, incentivisation of excessive capital expenditure 
by the incumbent and over-centralisation of governance which characterised the 
imperial system seem, more than 60 years on, hard to credit. No wonder both external 
forces, of which the USA was emblematic, and internal forces, embodied by 
Australia, eventually subjected the legacy system to pressures it could not 
accommodate. But the process whereby imperial hegemony in telecommunications, 
embodied in the single system Cable and Wireless oligopoly, gave way to a more 
pluralised, more competitive, more innovative, less centralised, interconnected 
network of networks - governed neither hierarchically (as a focus on the autocratic 
internal governance of Cable and Wireless centred on a sulky abstaining Wilshaw 
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suggests) nor co-operatively, through the (tight and white) imperial family, in the 
modern governance jargon, networked governance - but increasingly through markets 
is not well explained by the established heuristic model of a successful neo-
mercantilist coup (see Hills 2002).  Power in global telecommunications certainly 
shifted from the British Empire to the US superpower but it did so incompletely as a 
consequence of shifts in both macro and micro global governance paradigms. In 
macrocosm from imperialism to a combination of bi-lateralism and globalisation and 
in microcosm from the networked, imperial “family” governance of the ICAC, CCC 
and CTB to market governance embodied in prices and contracts. The Bermuda 
Agreement saw the first formal expression of this transition – it was thus a fulcrum 
moment in the evolution of global communications and in the unravelling of the ties 
of empire.  
                                                 
i
 Closing statement at Bermuda Conference by Sir Raymond Birchall, Chair UK Delegation, Annex G 
to Minutes of 2nd and Final Meeting of the Conference. National Archives of Canada, Ottawa hereafter 
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(Soward 75). 
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 23 
                                                                                                                                            
ix
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xxiv
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December 1945. NAC Department of External Affairs file 8085-40C pt 1. RG25 3784. 
xxv
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ICS 118/2/1/3. B.T.C. (45) Minutes of the 2nd and final meeting. Annex A p 1. 
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xxvii
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Arrangements Committee required only a single page; the Technical Developments Committee seven 
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session. Timetabling permitted all delegates to attend all meetings of all Committees (except the single 
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xxviii
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xxxiv
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xxxv
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Commonwealth system provoking the comment (Bowie to Browne 19 December 1951) by Bowie 
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